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PRESUMED GENERAL COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION: A
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE
JP C. LovE*
Are presumed general compensatory damages available in constitutional
tort litigation in the United States? A cursory glance at recent Supreme
Court decisions' might suggest a negative answer, but it is the thesis of this
essay that the court has not categorically prohibited the recovery of presumed
general damages in all types of constitutional tort actions. Rather, the Court
has circumscribed the types of fact situations in which an award of presumed
general damages would be appropriate.
This symposium is a tribute to Justice Powell. Like the other contributors to the symposium, I have taken this occasion to discuss opinions
written by Justice Powell when he was a member of the United States
Supreme Court. Unlike the other authors, however, I have not developed
the theme that Justice Powell was a centrist. Rather, I have chosen to
develop the theme that Justice Powell's opinions on constitutional tort
damages reflect the basic principles of corrective justice.
This piece is the first in a series of articles that I intend to write about
constitutional tort remedies. I have chosen to begin with a discussion of
presumed general compensatory damages because these damages are the one
type of common law tort remedy that the United States Supreme Court has
not yet definitively extended to constitutional tort plaintiffs. It is my position
that the remedy of presumed general damages ought to be available in
constitutional tort litigation in any case in which the remedy is necessary
to "correct injustice." I will argue in this piece that the Supreme Court
has not foreclosed the recognition of an award of presumed general damages
in constitutional tort litigation. In my later articles, I will identify the
particular types of cases in which presumed general damages ought to be
awarded and develop the criteria by which such damages ought to be
assessed.
I have two audiences in mind as I write this piece. First, I am addressing
civil rights lawyers, constitutional law scholars, and judges adjudicating
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1968, University of Wisconsin.
I am particularly indebted to the participants of both the International Symposium on the
Law of Remedies and the Faculty Workshop at the University of Texas for their constructive

comments in 1989 on an earlier draft of this essay. I am also grateful to Patrick Bauer, Alan
Brownstein, William Buss, Patricia Cain, Robert Clinton, Dan Dobbs, Cynthia Estlund, Michael
Green, Ken Kress, Emma Jordan, Samuel Issacharoff, Doug Rendleman, and Elaine Shoben

for helping me to rethink the fundamental premises of this piece. Finally, I have received
superb research assistance from Madolyn Crumpton and Kate Ohlandt, two of my law students
at the University of Texas during the 1989-90 term.
1. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Carey v. Piphus,

435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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constitutional tort disputes in the United States. Second, I am addressing
lawyers, scholars and judges in Commonwealth countries (such as Canada)
who are turning to American precedents for guidance as they develop
constitutional tort remedies in their own jurisdictions. 2 My objective is to
assist both audiences in correctly interpreting the United States Supreme
Court's decisions concerning presumed general damages.' I will begin by
analyzing the opinions very carefully, placing them in context. Then I will
examine one particular type of fact situation-the denial of the right to
vote-in which I believe the Supreme Court has indicated that it would be
willing to allow the recovery of presumed general damages. Finally, I will
focus on the voting rights case as a paradigmatic cause of action, analyzing
it to identify the types of factors that might justify awards of presumed
general damages in other types of constitutional tort actions.
I.

PURPOSES OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

In common law tort litigation, compensatory damages usually are regarded as serving two functions simultaneously-compensation and deterrence. They are awarded in an amount intended to make the plaintiff
whole-to compensate the plaintiff for the loss inflicted by the defendant's
tortious conduct. 4 They also are intended to deter both the defendant and
others from committing comparable tortious acts in the future.5
In constitutional tort litigation, compensatory damages are supposed to
serve the same two functions-compensation and deterrence. 6 The problem
is that, in many constitutional tort actions, plaintiffs are suing for nonpecuniary losses, 7 such as the harm caused by the deprivation of the right to

vote." It is difficult for the plaintiff to prove the monetary value of this
type of loss due to its intangible nature. Yet, if the plaintiff is not successful
in recovering a substantial sum of money for such a loss, then the compensatory damages award will have neither the desired compensatory nor
deterrent effect.
Common-law judges have confronted a similar dilemma in dignitary
tort actions for nonpecuniary losses. They have resolved the dilemma by
authorizing the recovery of presumed general damages. 9 That is, commonlaw judges have allowed juries to "presume" from the facts establishing
the defendant's liability (e.g., proof that the defendant published a libelous
statement) that the plaintiff sustained a significant intangible loss (e.g., loss
of reputation), thereby justifying a substantial award of compensatory

2. See, e.g., Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Tort Theory for the CharterDamages Remedy,
52 SASK. L. REv. 1 (1988).
3. See cases cited supra note 1.
LAW OF REMDiEs § 3.1 (1973).
See generally Gumo CALABR.SI, THE COSTS OF AccDENTs (1970).
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978).
See cases cited supra note 1.
See cases cited infra part IV.A.
DOBBS, supra note 4, at 528.

4. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON iH

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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damages. 0 The question posed by this essay is whether judges adjudicating
civil rights claims for such intangible losses as the harm caused by the
deprivation of the right to vote also may authorize the recovery of presumed
general damages.
II.

TYiE's OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

Because the courts and commentators do not always use the same
language in describing the various types of compensatory damages, I will
define the terms that I am using in this essay. Compensatory damages may
be classified as follows:
Compensatory Damages
Special (Actual)

,,2ena
Presumed

Proven (Actual)

"General" compensatory damages are the "damages that courts believe
'generally' flow from the kind of substantive wrong done by the defendant."" "Special" (or "consequential") compensatory damages are all other
damages that are "more or less peculiar to the particular plaintiff and [that]
would not be expected to occur regularly to other plaintiffs in similar
circumstances."'12 Special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved,
and courts require more stringent proof of special damages than of general
13
damages.

General damages may be either "presumed" or "proven." Usually,
they are proven. "Proven general damages" require proof of the fact of
harm and, to the extent feasible, proof of the extent of harm. 4 For example,
a plaintiff who is negligently injured in an automobile accident must prove
both the fact of physical injury and the amount of pain and suffering
flowing from that physical injury. If the plaintiff also sustains personal

property damage, then the plaintiff must prove both the fact of harm to
the property and the value of the harm done to the property. In addition
to being entitled to an award of "proven general damages," the accident
victim will be allowed to recover special damages for individualized losses,
such as medical expenses and lost earning capacity. Both "proven general

10. See generally RoDNEY A. SMou.A, LAW OF DmFAMtnON (1991).
11. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 138. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoD) OF TORTS § 904 (1979),
defines general damages as "compensatory damages for a harm so frequently resulting from
the tort that is the basis of the action that the existence of the damages is normally to be
anticipated and hence need not be alleged to be proved."
12. DoBBs, supra note 4, at 138.
13. Id. at 139.
14. "Proven general damages" is a term that I have created to describe general damages
that are not presumed.
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damages" and "special damages" may be described as "actual damages,"

meaning that they are awarded for actual, proven losses. 5
General damages rarely are presumed. When presumed damages are
recoverable, courts infer both the fact of harm and the extent of harm

from the circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct. 6 For example,
if the plaintiff has established liability in a common law action for libel per
se or slander per se, then the court will award (1) nominal damages based
on an inference that the plaintiff in fact sustained reputational harm,' and
(2) presumed general damages based on an inference that the plaintiff
sustained a substantial amount of both reputational and psychic (or emotional) harm. 8 The plaintiff will be permitted to offer specific evidence of
the reputational or psychic harm, but this proof will not be required 9 unless
the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption of general damages by

proving that the plaintiff's reputation was a poor one. 20 Once the defendant
offers such evidence, the plaintiff will have to submit counter-proof of a
good reputation2' in order to recover a substantial amount of general
damages. If the plaintiff fails to present counter-proof, the plaintiff's
recovery may be reduced to a small amount of general damages or to a
judgment for nominal damages only.22
Presumed general damages also are recoverable at common law in
actions for offensive battery, assault, false imprisonment, malicious
15. In both Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978), and Memphis Community Sch.
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1986), after rejecting the plaintiffs' request for
presumed general damages, the Supreme Court allowed the recovery of damages for "actual
injury." I will use the term "actual damages" to describe compensation for such "actual
injury." The Supreme Court failed to emphasize in Carey and Stachura that "damages for
actual injury" may be either general or special. As a result, some people confuse "actual
damages" with "special damages."
16. The RBSTATEMENT (SECOND)OF ToRTs § 904 cmt. a (1979) states that "there need
be no proof of the extent of the harm, since the existence of the harm may be assumed and
its extent is inferred as a matter of common knowledge from the existence of the injury."
17. SMou.A, supra note 10, § 9.0211] (Mar. 1989); Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875, 877-91 (1956). By contrast, in actions for libel per quod or
slander, the plaintiff must prove "special damages" in order to establish liability. CHARLEs T.
McCoRmICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF D~ Aoas § 116 (1935).
For an excellent discussion of the three concepts of reputation-property, honor and
dignity-see Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 69k (1986).
For a criticism of the common law rules, see Francis D. Murnaghan, From Figment to
Fiction to Philosophy-The Requirement of Proof of Damages in Libel Actions, 22 CAnH. U.
L. Rav. 1 (1972) (advocating adoption of new rule allowing only recovery of proven general
damages in common law defamation actions).
18. SMOu.A, supra note 10, § 9.05[1] (Mar. 1989).
19. MCCORMCK, supra note 17, § 116.
20. SMOLLA, supra note 10, § 9.10[4][a], [b] (Feb. 1990); S. M. WAnDnoms, Ta LAW OF
DAMAOEs 302-03 (1983).
21. HAxvEY MCGREGOR, DAmAG
s 1679-84 (15th ed. 1988).
22. SMoL.A, supra note 10, § 9.10[4][b] (Feb. 1990). In dire circumstances, the plaintiff's
reputation may sink so low that the plaintiffs cause of action is dismissed altogether. Id.
§ 9.10[4][d] (Feb. 1990).
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prosecution m and invasion of privacy. 24 Courts will award nominal damages
in these actions based on the inferred fact of psychic harm and substantial
sums of presumed general damages based on the inferred amount of psychic
harm. Although rebuttal evidence is admissible, the defendants in these
cases typically do not offer evidence disproving the presumption of psychic
harm. A plaintiff who is entitled to receive presumed general damages in
one of these common-law actions also is entitled to receive special damages
for individualized losses such as medical expenses or lost earning capacity.
III.

PRESMED GENRAL DAmAGES FOR THE INHERENT VALUE OF A
CoNsTrrUTONAL RIGHT

The first United States Supreme Court decision to consider whether
presumed general damages should be recoverable in constitutional tort
litigation was Carey v. Piphus,25 an action for a deprivation of procedural
due process. Prior to Carey, several commentators had developed a "grand
theory" about the overriding importance of the deterrent function of
compensatory damages in constitutional tort litigation.26 To ensure that
awards of compensatory damages would be large enough to have the desired
deterrent effect, these commentators recommended the recognition of "presumed general damages" in the form of "quasi-punitive damages" for the
"inherent value of a constitutional right." These damages were to be
awarded in all constitutional tort actions, regardless of the nature of the
harm actually sustained by the plaintiff and regardless of the defendant's
state of mind. The Court in Carey rejected the basic premise of this grand
theory. 27 It refused to place any special emphasis on the deterrent function
of compensatory damages in civil rights litigation. The Court phrased its
decision in the language of statutory interpretation: "To the extent that
Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation
of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a
deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory
damages."u
Specifically, the Court in Carey reversed the court of appeals' ruling
that "substantial nonpunitive" damages should be recoverable without any

23. DoBBS, supra note 4, at 528.
24. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 964-66 (1989).
25. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
26. See Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section
1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 464-67 (1978); Doug
Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531, 666-67 (1975);
Mark G. Yudof, Liability for ConstitutionalTorts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official,
49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1322, 1366-83 (1976); John G. Niles, Comment, Civil Actions for Damages
Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 Tax. L. REv. 1015 (1967).
27. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978).
28 Id.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:67

proof of actual harm29 by two high school students who had been suspended
from school without a hearing for twenty days, but who were readmitted
on the eighth and seventeenth days of their suspensions pursuant to pretrial
injunctions issued by the trial court judge.3 0 The Court expressly declined
to adopt the plaintiffs' theory that "constitutional rights are valuable in
and of themselves," and that an award of presumed general damages is
needed "to deter violations of constitutional rights." ' 31 Instead, the Court
ruled that, on remand, the trial court could award the plaintiffs only (1)
proven general damages for the "emotional distress actually ... caused by
the denial of procedural due process itself";3 2 and (2) special damages "to
compensate them for injuries caused by the suspensions ' 3 3 (e.g., damages
for the pecuniary value of each day of school that they had missed and
damages for the emotional distress that they had experienced as a result of
the suspensions). The plaintiffs could recover proven general damages
regardless of whether the suspensions were justified, but special damages
would be recoverable only if the suspensions were unjustified.3 4 Additionally,
the Seventh Circuit ruled that, on remand, the trial court should shift the
burden of proof on the issue of causation in the special damages claims to
the defendants. That is, to avoid liability for special damages, the defendants
would have to prove that the plaintiffs "would have been suspended even
if a proper hearing had been held." '3 5 The burden of persuasion was shifted
because the defendants would have had the burden of proving that the
suspensions were legally justified had they conducted the constitutionally
required hearing.
Carey thus can be characterized as a case in which the Court refused
to recognize presumed general damages for the inherent value of a deprivation of procedural due process. The post-Carey commentators sharply
criticized the Court for refusing to recognize presumed general damages in
actions for denials of procedural due process.3 6 Realizing, however, that the
Court was unlikely to reverse itself, these commentators concentrated on
the question left unanswered by Carey: Should presumed general damages
be available in actions for violations of substantive constitutional rights?
The post-Carey commentators tried to resuscitate the "grand theory" re-

29. Id.at 252-53, 264. The plaintiffs had sought $5,000 in presumed and punitive
damages. Id.at 251.
30. Id.at 248-52.
31. Id.at 254.
32. Id.at 263.
33. Id.at 260.
34. Id.at 260, 263, 266-67.
35. Id.at 260.
36. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, Crv. RiGHrs AND Crvn LmERTIms LmiGATION § 4.03 (2d
ed. 1986); Jean C. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67
CAL. L. REv. 1242 (1979); Note, DamagesAwards for ConstitutionalTorts: A Reconsideration
after Carey v. Piphus, 93 HiAv. L. Rxv. 966 (1980); see also Marilyn L. Pilkington, Damages
as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, 62 CAN. B.
REv. 517 (1984).

19921

PRESUMED DAMAGES

garding the overriding importance of the deterrent function of compensatory
damages in constitutional tort litigation.3 7 They argued that Carey's rejection
of the deterrent theory had been restricted to actions for deprivations of
procedural due process, and they encouraged the courts to authorize the
recovery of presumed general damages in all actions for violations of
substantive constitutional rights.
A few federal and state court judges followed the advice of the postCarey commentators. 3 They ruled that presumed general damages were
recoverable in actions for violations of substantive constitutional rights, and
they gave the following pattern jury instruction, which first appeared in
39
Herrera v. Valentine:
If you find that the plaintiff has been deprived of a constitutional
right, you may award damages to compensate her for the deprivation. Damages for this type of injury are more difficult to measure
than damages for a physical injury or injury to one's property.
There are no medical bills or other expenses by which you can
judge how much compensation is appropriate. In one sense, no
monetary value we place upon constitutional rights can measure
their importance in our society or compensate a citizen adequately
for their deprivation. However, just because these rights are not
capable of precise evaluation does not mean that an appropriate
monetary amount should not be awarded.
The precise value you place upon any constitutional right which
you find was denied to plaintiff is within your discretion. You may
wish to consider the importance of the right in our system of
government, the role which this right has played in the history of
our republic, and the significance of the right in the context of the
activities which the plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the
violation of the right. 4°
In one line of cases, the judges who gave the Herrerainstruction dsked
the jury to return a special verdict identifying the precise amount of any
presumed general damages awarded for the inherent value of a constitutional
right. For example, in Lewis v. Harrison School District No. 1,4 1 a high
school principal whose wife had been transferred to another district, who
had protested the personnel decision at a public school board meeting, and
who then had been fired in violation of his First Amendment right to
37. For example, a student commentator who was advocating the recognition of presumed
general damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment relied heavily upon the deterrent
theory developed prior to Carey by Dean Yudof. Comment, PresumedDamages for Fourth
Amendment Violations, 129 U. PA. L. Ray. 192, 220 (1980).
38. See cases cited infra notes 39-46. Other courts awarded only proven general damages.
See, e.g., Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980).
39. 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
40. Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1227 (8th Cir. 1981).
41. 805 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987).
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freedom of speech was awarded presumed general damages "for the violation of [his] first amendment right" in the amount of $5,000 plus special
damages for back pay in the amount of $25,348. In City of Riviera Beach
v. Fitzgerald,42 a police officer who had been denied a hearing on his claim
that he was arbitrarily deprived of a promotion was awarded $125;000 "for
the denial of [substantive] due process of law" and $45,000 for lost wages.
And in Young v. City of Centreville,4 a man who had been shot in the
back by a police officer using excessive force in making an arrest was
awarded $25,000 "for the value of his lost constitutional rights" under the
Fourth Amendment and $5,000 in special damages for his one-week hospitalization.
In another line of cases, the judges who gave the Herrera instruction
told the jury to return a general verdict for presumed general, proven
general, and special compensatory damages. Such a general verdict encompassed a wide range of losses, including lost wages, emotional distress, and
the inherent value of the substantive constitutional right at issue. For
example, in the Herrera case itself,44 an Indian woman who was visibly in
the later months of pregnancy had been kicked in the stomach by a police
officer, in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty, when
he was attempting to arrest her husband. The officer then forced her into
the back of his patrol car and ignored her pleas for medical attention.
Instead of driving her a few blocks to a hospital, he took her twenty miles
to the county jail. Her unborn child died in her womb and was delivered
dead two weeks later. The jury was told to assess damages based upon her
physical pain and suffering, her emotional distress, and the value of her
constitutional rights. It returned a general verdict of $300,000 in compensatory damages, which was affirmed on appeal.
Similarly, in Corriz v. Naranjo,4 an eighteen-year-old young man was
shot in the back by a police officer who had just ordered him to leave the
scene of an arrest, in violation of his right to liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The jury was told to award damages for the young man's
medical expenses, lost earnings, pain and suffering, emotional distress and
the value of his constitutional rights. The trial judge gave the Herrera
instruction and also told the jury that the value of a constitutional right,
"while difficult to assess, must be considered great." 4 The jury returned a
verdict of $30,000 in compensatory damages, which was affirmed on appeal.
Both of these lines of cases awarding presumed general damages for
the inherent value of a substantive constitutional right pursuant to the
Herrera instruction were disapproved by the Supreme Court in Memphis
42. 492 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 503 So. 2d 326 (Fla.
1987).
43. 523 N.E.2d 621 (I1. App. Ct. 1988).
44. Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
45. 667 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 971, and cert. dismissed, 458
U.S. 1123 (1982).
46. Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 971, and
cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1123 (1982).
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Community School District v. Stachura.47 The plaintiff in Stachura was a
tenured teacher who had shown films regarding human sexuality in his
seventh-grade life science class. In April of 1979, after parental and community protest, he was suspended with pay but without an adequate hearing,
in violation of both his right to procedural due process and his First
Amendment right to free speech. He filed a section 1983 action during the
summer of 1979, and, as a result, he was reinstated at the beginning of the
fall term. 48 He then pursued his claim for compensatory and punitive
damages. He proved at the trial that he was "embarrassed" by extensive
publicity in the local media, which repeated the allegations against him,
including the charge that he was a "sex maniac." News of the event "went
around the world" and was reported by Esquire magazine in its Dubious
Achievement Awards. He and his family received harassing phone calls,
and refuse was left on their porch. He became very withdrawn from his
friends and family. 49 The jury was told that it could award Stachura three
types of compensatory damages: Proven general damages for his loss of
reputation and emotional distress; special damages for his out-of-pocket
expenses; and presumed general damages for the inherent value of his
constitutional rights.50 The jury received the Herrerainstruction." It returned
a general verdict for compensatory damages against the school board and
the individual defendants in the amount of $275,000, which was reduced to
$266,750 after the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict
as to one of the individual defendants.52 The jury also awarded a 5total
of
3
$36,000 in punitive damages against the nine individual defendants.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the general verdict for compensatory damages
on the theory that "there was ample proof of actual injury to plaintiff
Stachura both in his effective discharge by the Memphis Community School
District and by the damage to his reputation and to his professional career
as a teacher."5' The appellate court believed that the jury "could have
found, as it did, actual and important damages. ' 5 The Sixth Circuit thus
affirmed the verdict without discussing the Herrera jury instruction. Implicitly, the Sixth Circuit held that even if the trial court judge had erred
in giving the Herrerainstruction, nevertheless the error was harmless because
the plaintiff had put in sufficient proof of actual harm to justify the verdict.

47. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
48. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 300-01 (1986).

49. This statement of the proven facts is taken from the court of appeals' opinion.
Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211, 215 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Memphis

Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
50. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 302.
51. Id. at 302-03.
52. Id. at 303.
53. Id.
54. Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Memphis
Community Sch. Dist.-v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
55. Id.
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The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision and remanded
for a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages.5 6 The Court ruled
that the submission of the Herrerainstruction constituted prejudicial error
because the instruction authorized the recovery of "noncompensatory damages" measured by the jury's "subjective perception of the importance of
constitutional rights as an abstract matter. ' 57 The error required a new trial
because there was no way to determine how much of the general verdict
reflected the jury's estimation of the value of the infringed constitutional
rights and how much of it reflected the jury's award of proven general and
special damages for the actual monetary and nonmonetary harms sustained
5
by the plaintiff.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Stachura, explicitly disapproved
those lower court decisions that had distinguished between violations of
substantive constitutional rights and deprivations of procedural due process,
allowing the recovery of "noncompensatory" damages for "the abstract
value" of substantive rights. 59 He justified the Court's rejection of presumed
general damages for the "inherent ' value" of a constitutional right by
emphasizing the fact that the common law does not authorize the recovery
of any type of damages for the "inherent value" of a legal right. Instead,
common-law tort damages are "designed to provide compensation for the
injury caused to [the] plaintiff." 6 He acknowledged that "[d]eterrence is
also an important purpose" of tort damages, but he observed that the
deterrent function of compensatory damages "operates through the mechanism of damages that are compensatory-damages grounded in determinations of plaintiff's actual losses." 61
With respect to the availability of presumed general damages for the
"injuries caused by the deprivation" of a constitutional right, Justice Powell
took the position that this particular issue had not been raised by the
plaintiff in Stachura.2 By requesting proven general compensatory damages
for the "harm caused by the violation" of his First Amendment rights, the
plaintiff had waived his right to request presumed general damages for this
harm because "[p]resumed damages are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a supplement for an award that fully compensates." 63
Despite the fact that the plaintiff had not raised the issue properly, Justice
Powell did provide some general guidance to the lower courts on the question
of whether it is appropriate to award presumed general damages for injuries

56. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 313 (1986). Upon remand,
the parties settled for approximately $200,000. Telephone interview with Erwin B. Ellman of
Levin, Levin, Garvett and Dill, P.C., Plaintiff's counsel in Stachura (Nov. 1990).
57. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 308.
58. Id. at 312-13.

59. Id. at 304, 309-10.
60. Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 309 n.13.

63. Id. at 310-12.
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caused by deprivations of constitutional rights. First, he interpreted section
1983 as presupposing that damages which "compensate for actual harm
ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations." ' Second, he observed
that presumed general damages "may possibly be appropriate" when a
plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is "likely to have occurred
but difficult to establish" because "presumed damages may roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate for
harms that may be impossible to measure." 65
The key to the Court's reasoning in Carey and Stachura is to be found
in Justice Powell's characterizations of what I have called "presumed general
damages for the inherent value of a constitutional right." In Carey, Justice
6
Powell referred to such damages as "substantial nonpunitive" damages.
6
7
In Stachura, he described them as "noncompensatory damages." In both
cases, he expressed concern that the plaintiffs were asking the Court to
authorize the recovery of a greater sum of money than they would have
been able to obtain under the rules governing common-law tort damages.
In Carey, the plaintiffs had been unsuccessful in their efforts to recover
6
punitive damages because they had failed to prove malices.
Justice Powell
thought that they were trying to avoid the relevant state-of-mind requirement
by asking for "quasi-punitive" damages in the form of presumed general
damages for the inherent value of their procedural due process rights. He
was not willing to allow them to recover the equivalent of punitive damages
without proof of malice.
In Stachura, the plaintiff had recovered proven general and special
compensatory damages for his monetary and nonmonetary harms. He had
also received an award of punitive damages, which was not challenged on
appeal. 69 Justice Powell thought that the plaintiff was trying to recover an
additional sum of "noncompensatory" damages measured by the value of
his constitutional rights. The Court was not willing to allow the plaintiff
to recover such "deterrent damages" in addition to compensatory and
punitive damages.
Carey and Stachura thus stand for the proposition that the Supreme
Court will not allow the recovery of presumed general damages for the
inherent value of either a procedural or a substantive constitutional right.
The Court is concerned that such damages never have been recognized by
the common law, and that they would be an "unwieldy tool for ensuring
compliance with the Constitution. ' 70 Moreover, the Court perceives a distinct danger that allowing the recovery of such damages would "inject

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 310.
Id.at 310-11.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978).
Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1986).
435 U.S. at 257 n.11.
Stachura, 477 U.S. at 302-03.
Id. at 310.
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caprice into determinations of damages in § 1983 cases." ' 7' Specifically, the
Court is concerned that juries would be free to award "arbitrary amounts
without any evidentiary basis" because "history and tradition do not afford
any sound guidance concerning the precise value that juries should place
on constitutional protections. '72
Although Justice Powell did not refer to principles of corrective justice
in either Carey or Stachura, I believe that the theory of corrective justice
advanced by Professor Ernest Weinrib 3 supports Justice Powell's reasoning.
Professor Weinrib develops the Aristotelian distinction between two forms
of justice: Corrective justice and distributive justice. 74 Corrective justice is
a bilateral process of adjudication designed to rectify the harm that a
wrongdoer has caused to a victim."5 Distributive justice is a multilateral
process of dividing a benefit or a burden in accord with a collectively
determined criterion, such as merit or need. 76 Professor Weinrib takes the
position that corrective justice is the form underlying tort law. 77 He then
argues that tort liability should be understood as serving a single, comprehensive objective-'"correcting injustice." He rejects the functionalist notion
that tort liability serves one or more utilitarian goals, such as compensation
or deterrence. 78 It follows from Professor Weinrib's theory regarding tort
liability that the purpose of compensatory damages is to "correct injustice,"
not simply "to compensate" or "to deter."
' 79
One can characterize the Carey request for "quasi-punitive damages
and the Stachura request for "noncompensatory damages" 0 as requests for
damages designed solely to deter violations of the United States Constitution.
Justice Powell's opinions rejected these requests for "deterrence damages"
and limited the award of compensatory damages in section 1983 actions to
the value of the harm caused to the victim by the wrongdoer. 8' Justice
Powell explained the Court's decision by saying that he could find no
evidence of Congressional intent to "establish a deterrent more formidable
than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages."81 2 Professor
Weinrib's theory of corrective justice validates Justice Powell's reasoning.
Since constitutional tort actions are grounded in common-law tort actions,
which are premised on principles of corrective justice, the Court properly
authorized the recovery of compensatory damages to "correct injustice,"

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485 (1989).

74. Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE
L.J. 949,
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

976-81 (1988).
Id. at 978.
Id. at 979.
Id. at 978.
Weinrib, supra note 73, at 501-03, 510-14, 525-26.
See supra text accompanying note 66.
See supra text accompanying note 67.
See supra text accompanying note 60.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978).
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but not to "deter constitutional deprivations." By ruling that compensatory

damages in constitutional tort'actions should be recoverable for no more
and no less than the full extent of the harm caused to the victim by the
wrongdoer, the Court ensured that constitutional tort plaintiffs would be

made whole and that defendants would be deterred from engaging in future
misconduct without overemphasizing the goal of deterrence.
IV.

PRESUMED GENERAL DAMAGES FOR THE NONMONETARY HARM CAUSED
BY A DEPRIVATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

Although the Supreme Court has refused to award presumed general

damages for the "inherent value" of a constitutional right, it has not
foreclosed the possibility of authorizing presumed general damages for
certain nonmonetary harms caused by the deprivation of a constitutional
right 33 In both Carey and Stachura, the Court explicitly reserved the
question of whether presumed general damages should be recoverable in
actions for a denial of the constitutional right to vote.84 In Carey, Justice
Powell spoke in terms of the possibility of authorizing presumed general
damages for "wrongful deprivations of the right to vote."" In Stachura,
Justice Powell abandoned the terminology of granting damages for "the
deprivation" of the right to vote and talked instead about awarding damages
for "the particular loss that the plaintiff suffered" as a result of a denial
of the right to vote. 6 He characterized the loss as a "nonmonetary harm
that cannot easily be quantified."87 Because such a loss is the type of injury
that "is likely to have occurred, but difficult to establish,""8 it is a loss for
which an award of presumed general damages might be appropriate.

9

83. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
84. Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 n.22; Stachura, 477 U.S. at 311 n.14.
85. 435 U.S. at 264 n.22.
86. 477 U.S. at 311 n.14.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 310-11.
89. Id. at 311 n.14. The post-Stachura commentators have not focused explicitly on the
issue of whether presumed general damages might be available for certain types of harms in
constitutional tort litigation. Instead, they have questioned whether compensation or deterrence
is the central function of compensatory damages in constitutional tort litigation. See, e.g.,
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damagesfor Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury
in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. Ray. 1461 (1989) (emphasizing compensatory function);
Sheldon Nahmod, ConstitutionalDamages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 VA.
L. Rnv. 997 (1990) (emphasizing deterrent function); Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional
Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. Ram. 337, 369-71 (1989). See generally Jack M.
Beermann, A CriticalApproach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42
STAN. L. Ray. 51 (1989); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts:
Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 Micr. L. Ray. 82 (1989); Sheldon Nahmod,
Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 Gao. L.J. 1719 (1989);
Daniel L. Rotenberg, Private Remedies for Constitutional Wrongs-A Matter of Perspective,
Priority and Process, 14 I-AsiiNos CONsT. L.Q. 77 (1986); Michael Wells, The Past and the
Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19
CoNN. L. Rav. 53 (1986) (advocating corrective justice approach to constitutional tort litigation); Case Comment, 100 HAv. L. Ray. 267 (1986) (discussing Stachura).
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The modification in Justice Powell's description of the harm suffered
by a voting rights plaintiff is significant. It underscores the fact that,
although the Court will not recognize presumed general damages for abstract
deprivations of constitutional rights, the Court might be willing to allow
the recovery of presumed general damages for certain intangible injuries
caused by violations of constitutional rights. Moreover, allowing the recovery
of presumed general damages for certain intangible injuries would be
completely consistent with Professor Weinrib's theory of corrective justice. 9°
When an intangible injury "is likely to have occurred, but difficult to
establish," 9' the plaintiff may not be able to submit sufficient evidence to
justify a substantial award of proven compensatory damages. In such a
case, proven general compensatory damages are not an adequate remedy to
rectify the wrong. But if the plaintiff is allowed to recover presumed general
damages, then the plaintiff will receive compensatory damages in an amount
that "may roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered,''9 and
the judgment for compensatory damages will be large enough to "correct
injustice."
A.

Presumed General Damages for the Nonmonetary Harm Caused by a
Deprivation of the Right to Vote

In both Carey and Stachura, Justice Powell focused on the voting rights
fact pattern. 93 He used it as a vehicle for discussing the possibility of
awarding presumed general damages in constitutional tort litigation because
there is common-law precedent dating back to the 1700s that authorizes the
recovery of presumed general damages in common-law tort actions for the
harm caused by the deprivation of the right to vote. The original case was
Ashby v. White, 94 in which the plaintiff was the victim of an isolated,
arbitrary denial of the right to vote. The House of Lords reinstated the
trial court's damage award of 200 pounds, adopting without discussion the
dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Holt in the intermediate court
of appeals. Chief Justice Holt pronounced that "[t]he right of voting ...
is a thing of the highest importance, and so great a privilege, that it is a
great injury to deprive the plaintiff of it." 9 He justified the award of
presumed general damages by saying "surely every injury imports a damage,
though it does not cost the party one farthing.'' 96 Specifically, he drew
analogies to the presumed general damages recoverable in actions for
defamation and offensive battery:
As in an action for slanderous words, though a man does not lose
a penny by reason of the speaking them, yet he shall have an
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra text accompanying notes 73-82.
Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310-11.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 84.
2 Ld. Raym. 938, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703).
Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, -, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (K.B. 1703).
Id. at -, 92 Eng. Rep. at 137.
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action. So if a man gives another a cuff on the ear, though it cost
him nothing, no not so much as a little diachylon, yet he shall have
his action, for it is a personal injury.Y
Based on these analogies, the House of Lords allowed the jury to infer
both the fact and the extent of the harm from the circumstances surrounding
the defendant's misconduct. 98 It noted that the purpose of this award of
presumed general damages was not only to compensate the plaintiff, but
also to deter such misconduct by public officials in the future.9
The precedent set in Ashby v. White has been followed in this country
on several occasions. The Supreme Court'00 and the lower federal courts' 01
followed Ashby in the voting rights cases that were litigated in the early
1900s. Black plaintiffs filed voting rights complaints under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, 1° 2 and white plaintiffs who had been deprived
of their right to vote in federal elections sued under the general federal
question statute.103 Under both statutes, the courts had to decide whether
to recognize a cause of action for damages allegedly caused by the deprivation of a constitutionally created, "political" right.' ° The issue was
05
an action brought under the
resolved affirmatively in Nixon v. Herndon,1
Fourteenth Amendment by a black man against election officials in Texas
for refusing to permit him to vote in a Democratic primary election on
account of his race. The Court ruled that the plaintiff could proceed with
his claim for $5,000 in general compensatory damages. °6 The Court said:
"That private damage may be caused by such political action and may be
recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred
years, since Ashby v. White."' °7 A lower federal court reached the same
conclusion in Wayne v. Venable, 1°8 a case brought under the general federal
question statute. In Wayne, a white male was allowed to recover $2,000 in
general compensatory damages against election officials in Arkansas who
had denied him his right to vote in a federal election.109

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. E.g., Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
101. E.g., Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919).
102. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368
(1915). See generally Emma C. Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the
Fifteenth Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REv. 389 (1985); Grier Stephenson, The Supreme Court,
The Franchise, and the Fifteenth Amendment: The First Sixty Years, 57 UMKC L. REv. 47

(1988).
103. See Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58

(1900).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

E.g., Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
Id.
Id. at 540.
Id.; accord, Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919).
Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 65, 70 (8th Cir. 1919).
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Once the Court had decided to allow the recovery of general compensatory damages for the violation of a constitutionally created, "political"
right, it became necessary to determine how to measure the extent of the
harm caused by the deprivation of such a right. The issue surfaced most
frequently in the cases filed under the general federal question statute
because the statute contained a jurisdictional amount requirement. That
requirement came before the Court in Wiley v. Sinkler,"0 a case in which
a white man who had been denied the right to vote in a federal election
sued for $2,500 in general compensatory damages. The defendant demurred
on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction "because it appeared on
the face of the complaint that a verdict for [the jurisdictional amount of]
$2,000 would be so excessive that the court would be required to set it
aside.""' The Court rejected the defendant's argument on the theory that
[the] amount of damages the plaintiff shall recover in such an action
is peculiarly appropriate for the determination of the jury, and no
opinion of the court upon that subject can justify it in holding that
the amount in controversy was insufficient to support the jurisdic2
tion of the Circuit Court."
Later, a federal appellate court in Wayne v. Venable' 3 described the method
for measuring the extent of harm caused by a deprivation of the right to
vote in a federal election as follows:
In the eyes of the law this right is so valuable that damages are
presumed from the wrongful deprivation of it without evidence of
actual loss of money, property, or any other valuable thing, and
the amount of the damages is a question peculiarly appropriate for
the determination of the jury, because each member of the jury has
4
personal knowledge of the value of the right."
Thus, the Wayne court acknowledged that it would be extremely difficult
for the plaintiff to offer proof of the extent of the nonmonetary harm
caused by the deprivation of the right to vote. To solve this problem, the
court followed the common-law tradition established in Ashby v. White,
recognizing presumed general damages as the appropriate remedy.
When Justice Powell reviewed the voting rights cases in Stachura, he
observed that the language in Wayne'15 could be interpreted as authorizing
the recovery of presumed general damages "for the value of the right to
vote.' 1116 Justice Powell insistod, however, that such an interpretation would
be a misreading of the text. He took the position that Wayne involved

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

179 U.S. 58 (1900).
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 60 (1900).
Id. at 65.
260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919).
Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 114.
Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 311-12 n.14 (1986).
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"nothing more than an award of presumed damages for a non-monetary
harm that cannot easily be quantified.""17 He elaborated upon his position
as follows:
The "value of the right" in the context of these decisions [Wayne
and Ashby] is the money value of the particular loss that the
plaintiff suffered-a loss of which "each member of the jury has
personal knowledge." It is not the value of the right to vote as a
general, abstract matter, based on its role in our history or system
of government."'
The difference between awarding presumed general damages for the
inherent value of the right to vote and awarding such damages for the
particular nonmonetary loss caused by a deprivation of the right to vote is
illustrated by the settlement agreement in a recent voting rights case, Vargas
v. Calabrese."9 In Vargas, the plaintiffs, who were African-American and
Hispanic registered voters, brought a class action for interference with their
voting rights during a mayoral election in Jersey City. They alleged that
the defendants had prevented or discouraged them from voting in the 1985
run-off election, and they sought compensatory damages. 20° The court found
that the plaintiffs had been the victims of unconstitutional, isolated deprivations of the right to vote.' 2 ' Because they had sustained an intangible loss
that could not easily be quantified, the court ruled that the plaintiffs were
2
entitled to recover presumed general damages.1
The class of approximately 1,000 plaintiffs entered into a settlement
agreement with the individual defendants for $590,000. Each plaintiff was
entitled to the payment of "nominal damages" in the amount of $50.'2
So-called "damage points" were then allocated to each plaintiff, ranging
from one to three points, depending upon whether the person "was subjected
to obstacles in voting (1 point), or was subjected to harassment, intimidation

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 634 F. Supp. 910 (D.N.J. 1986), aff 'd, 949 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1991).
120. Vargas v. Calabrese, 634 F. Supp. 910, 913 (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd, 949 F.2d 665 (3d
Cir. 1991). As originally filed, the complaint in Vargas also sought injunctive and declaratory
relief on the theory that the defendants had been acting pursuant to the New Jersey Election
Laws, which allegedly violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. Id. The Vargas court ruled, however, that the New Jersey Election Laws did
not authorize the defendants' conduct. Id. at 930. Consequently, the case was transformed
into an action primarily for substitutionary relief for the unconstitutional, statutorily unauthorized deprivation of the plaintiffs' right to vote. In addition to the substitutionary relief,
the plaintiffs obtained a consent decree from the government defendants agreeing to protect
the rights of minority voters in the upcoming Gubernatorial Election. Id. at 913.
121. Id. at 930.
122. Vargas v. Calabrese, No. 85-4125, slip op. at 27-29 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 1990), aff'd,
949 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1991). I received a copy of this unpublished opinion from one of the
plaintiffs' lawyers, Professor Samuel Issacharoff. A copy of the trial court's opinion is on file
with the Washington & Lee Law Review.
123. Id. at 8.
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or abuse (2 points) or was actually prevented from voting (3 points)."'2
The money remaining in the settlement fund after the payment of nominal
5
damages was to be distributed in accordance with the damage points.'2
The trial court ruled in March of 1990 that the terms of the settlement
agreement were not "unreasonable,"' 2 6 and, therefore, the defendants'
liability insurer would be required to indemnify the defendants under the
terms of the defendants' comprehensive business insurance policy. 127 The
trial court correctly held that neither Carey nor Stachura precluded the
recovery of presumed general damages in a voting rights case. Furthermore,
the court correctly observed that "deprivations of the right to vote are
precisely the type of [presumed] actual damages, even if difficult to quantify,
that may properly be based on a jury's determination of what the presumed
harm might have been for the jury [if the jurors had] suffered the unlawful
2
conduct."'
The settlement agreement in Vargas is an excellent vehicle for thinking
about the difference between the "presumed general damages for the inherent value of a constitutional right" prohibited by Carey and Stachura
and the "presumed general damages for a particular loss" authorized by
the common-law courts in voting rights cases. Had the settlement agreement
in Vargas awarded damages for the "inherent value" of a constitutional
right, each plaintiff would have received a uniform sum of money. But
because the agreement awarded presumed general damages for the "particular loss" sustained by each plaintiff, the three groups of plaintiffs received
varying amounts of money, depending upon the circumstances. Those
plaintiffs who were prevented from voting received a larger sum than those
who were discouraged from voting. And those who were severely harassed
received a larger sum than those who were mildly obstructed from voting.
There can be such variations in the amount of presumed general damages
because the purpose of awarding such damages is to "correct injustice" by
fully compensating the individual plaintiffs for their particular losses.
B.

Types of Nonmonetary Harms Compensable by Presumed General
Damages

In Stachura, Justice Powell drew a sharp distinction between presumed
general damages for the "inherent" or "abstract" value of a constitutional
right and presumed general damages for an "intangible injury" caused by

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 22, 29, 36.
127. Id. at 30, 36-37. The court had previously ruled that the policy covered constitutional
torts. Vargas v. Calabrese, 714 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1989), aff'd, 949 F.2d 665 (3d Cir.
1991).
128. Vargas v. Calabrese, No. 85-4125, slip op. at 28 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 1990), aff'd, 949
F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1991). The trial court used the phrase "actual" rather than "presumed
general" damages. Id. The trial court also ruled that presumed general damages are not
"punitive," and, therefore, they are covered by liability insurance. Id. at 29-30.
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a deprivation of a constitutional right. Unfortunately, he did not draw a
comparably sharp distinction between the nonmonetary harm experienced
by a voting rights plaintiff, for which presumed general damages are allowed
by the common-law courts, and the nonmonetary harm experienced by a
procedural due process plaintiff, for which presumed- general damages are
barred by Carey.
The plaintiffs in Carey based their requests for presumed general
damages on two theories: (1) Such damages should be awarded "for the
deprivation of a constitutional right whether or not any injury was caused
by the deprivation"; and (2) such damages should be awarded because
"every deprivation of procedural due process may be presumed to cause
some injury." 129 To the extent that the plaintiffs sought presumed general
damages for the "inherent value of a constitutional right," which was the
gist of their first theory, the damages claimed in Carey can readily be
distinguished from the damages awarded in Ashby and Wayne. The damages
claimed in Carey were for the "abstract" value of a constitutional right;
by contrast, the damages awarded in Ashby and Wayne were for the
"nonmonetary harm" caused by a deprivation of a constitutional right.
On the other hand, to the extent that the plaintiffs in Carey sought
presumed general damages for the "injury" "presumed" to be caused by
the deprivation of procedural due process, which was the gist of their second
theory, the damages claimed in Carey are more difficult to distinguish from
the damages awarded in Ashby and Wayne. In all three cases, the plaintiffs
prayed for presumed general damages for a nonmonetary harm that they
perceived to be difficult to prove. In Ashby and Wayne, the plaintiffs were
allowed to recover presumed general damages for the injury caused by the
denial of the right to vote. Justice Powell described the injury as the
"inability to vote in a particular election" and characterized the harm as
"nonquantifable." 130 In Carey, the plaintiffs were restricted to the recovery
of proven general damages for the harm caused by the denial of procedural
due process. Justice Powell described the injury as "emotional distress"
and characterized the harm as "susceptible to proof." '
Justice Powell never explained the nature of the difference between the
nonmonetary harm caused by a violation of the right to vote and the
nonmonetary harm caused by a deprivation of procedural due process. In
Carey, he only compared the harm caused by a deprivation of procedural
due process with the harm caused by the publication of a defamatory
statement.3 2 He did not describe the harm caused by a violation of the
right to vote. In Stachura, he discussed the nature of the harm caused by
a denial of the right to vote,' but he never distinguished the harm sustained

129.
130.
131.
132.
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435 U.S. at 254.
Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 311 n.14 (1986).
435 U.S. at 262 n.17.
Id. at 262-63.
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by the plaintiffs in Ashby and Wayne from the harm sustained by the
plaintiffs in Carey. Consequently, we can only speculate about what Justice
Powell must have thought to be the critical differences between the harm
caused by a violation of the right to vote and the harm caused by a
deprivation of procedural due process. Furthermore, our speculations will
have to be based upon what he said in Carey about the differences between
the harm caused by a defamatory statement and the harm caused by a
deprivation of procedural due process.
With respect to the harm caused by a defamatory statement, Justice
Powell observed that statements which are defamatory per se "are virtually
34
certain to cause serious injury to reputation" as well as emotional distress .
This kind of injury is "extremely difficult to prove."'' 35 Nevertheless, due
to the "likelihood" of nonmonetary harm and the "difficulty of proving"
such harm, the common-law courts allow the recovery of presumed general
136
damages in actions for defamation per se.
Is the nature of the harm caused by a deprivation of procedural due
process sufficiently similar to the nature of the injury caused by the
publication of a defamatory statement to justify an award of presumed
general damages? The Carey court ruled that it was not for two reasons.
First, Justice Powell thought that the "likelihood of harm" was much
greater in actions for defamation. The publication of a defamatory statement
to a third person is "virtually certain to cause serious injury" to the
plaintiff's good standing in the community, causing the plaintiff to suffer
both a loss of reputation and emotional distress. 37 By contrast, a plaintiff
could be the victim of a violation of procedural due process but be unaware
of the violation until he or she later consulted a lawyer regarding the
perceived substantive deprivation of life, liberty or property.13 And, regardless of the timing of the discovery of the procedural violation, the
plaintiff might very well "suffer no distress over the procedural
irregularities"' 139 because of the unique "ambiguity" regarding the issue of
"causation" in actions for deprivations of procedural due process. 4 When
a deprivation of life, liberty or property is justified, but procedures are
deficient, "whatever distress a person feels may be attributable to the
justified deprivation rather than to deficiencies in procedure.' ' 4' There is
no comparable ambiguity complicating the issue of causation in an action
for defamation. Both loss of reputation and emotional distress are apt to
42
be directly attributable to the publication of the defamatory statement.
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Second, Justice Powell thought that the "difficulty of proving" harm
was greater in actions for defamation.1 4 The publication of a defamatory
statement causes a harm that "is frequently not susceptible of objective
proof" because "[llibel and slander work their evil in ways that are invidious
and subtle." 1" By contrast, the emotional distress caused by a deprivation
of procedural due process is "a personal injury familiar to the law. 1' 45 It
is "customarily proved by showing the nature and circumstances of the
wrong and its effect on the plaintiff." 1 "
To summarize, Justice Powell characterized the harm experienced by
the Carey plaintiffs as "emotional distress," and he found that "neither
the likelihood of [mental and emotional distress] nor the difficulty of proving
it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof
that such injury actually was caused." 1 47 On this basis, he distinguished the
harm caused by defamation per se from the harm caused by a denial of
procedural due process.
Now that we understand what Justice Powell believed to be the critical
differences between the harm caused by defamation and the harm caused
by a due process violation, we can begin to speculate about what he must
have perceived to be the differences between the harm caused by a denial
of the right to vote and the harm caused by a deprivation of procedural
due process. Focusing first on the "likelihood of harm," Justice Powell
must have thought that any time a plaintiff is denied the right to vote, the
plaintiff is "virtually certain" to experience an intangible harm. Unlike the
unwitting victim of a procedural due process violation, the plaintiff in a
voting rights case is immediately aware of the injury. Also, there is no
ambiguity surrounding the issue of causation in a voting rights case. The
intangible harm that the plaintiff experiences is directly attributable to the
denial of the right to vote.
Turning now to the "difficulty of proving" harm, we must ask ourselves
three questions: (1) What did Justice Powell perceive to be the nature of
the harms caused by denials of voting and procedural due process rights?
(2) What did Justice Powell perceive to be the appropriate remedies for
infringements of these rights? and (3) What did Justice Powell perceive to
be the "difficulty of proving" the harms for which damages might be
recoverable in causes of action for violations of these rights?
With respect to the nature of the harm caused by deprivations of voting
rights, Justice Powell's citations14 to Ashby v. White 49 and Nixon v.
50
Herndon'
suggest that he would have characterized the harm caused by a
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denial of the right to vote as "private damage ... caused by... political
action."'' The right to vote is a "political" right. Interference with the
right causes an "intangible injury"-the "inability to vote in a particular
election.' 52 Emotional distress may be experienced by a voting rights
plaintiff, but it is not the primary type of nonmonetary harm caused by a
denial of the right to vote.
What does Justice Powell perceive to be the nature of the harm caused
by a deprivation of procedural due process? One might take the position
that he regards "emotional distress" as the only harm that flows from a
violation of procedural due process. Certainly that is the term that he uses
to describe the intangible injury for which the Carey plaintiffs sought
presumed general damages."' However, by focusing on Justice Powell's
description of the objectives of procedural due process rules, I would like
to advance a different interpretation of his opinion in Carey. Justice Powell
took the position that procedural due process rules "are meant to protect
persons ... from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty,
or property" and to "convey to the individual a feeling that the government
has dealt with him fairly.' ' 54 These words suggest that the constitutional
right to procedural due process is a "procedural" right. One can reasonably
infer that an interference with a procedural right would cause an "intangible
injury," which might be called the "inability to participate in a hearing
prior to being deprived of life, liberty or property." Emotional distress may
be experienced by a procedural due process plaintiff, but it is not the only
type of nonmonetary harm caused by the violation of this constitutional
right.
If my interpretation of Justice Powell's opinion in Carey is correct,
then one can draw certain analogies between the harm caused by a violation
of the right to vote and the harm caused by a violation of procedural due
process. Both of these rights are "means" to an end. The right to vote is
a means to the end of participating in the political process; a means to
participating in the distributive justice process. The right to procedural due
process is a means to the end of participating in the judicial (or quasijudicial) process; a means to participating in the corrective justice process.
Consequently, an interference with either of these two rights will cause a
peculiar type of nonmonetary harm-an "inability" to exercise a right that
represents a means to an end.
Of course, drawing such an analogy might seem to suggest that voting
rights plaintiffs should receive the same remedies as procedural due process
plaintiffs in constitutional tort litigation. Yet we know that Justice Powell
refused to award presumed general damages to the procedural due process
plaintiffs in Carey while he expressed a willingness through dictum in
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Stachura to award presumed general damages to voting rights plaintiffs. To
understand how Justice Powell could have taken two such apparently
inconsistent positions, we must now examine the types of remedies that he
perceived to be available for infringements of voting and procedural due
process rights.
With respect to remedies for voting rights violations in a case like
Ashby v. Whitel55 or Nixon v. Herndon, ss Justice Powell thought that there
was only one appropriate remedy-damages. Injunctive relief was not an
available remedy because election day had passed, and the plaintiffs had
not complained about any threats of future misconduct. With respect to
remedies for procedural due process violations in a case like Carey, s7 Justice
Powell perceived that there were two appropriate, complementary remediesprospective injunctive relief and retrospective damages. The plaintiffs in
Carey had obtained a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction from the trial court ordering the defendants to reinstate them until
such time as the defendants had conducted an appropriate hearing.'
In
addition, the plaintiffs were allowed to claim compensatory damages for
the past harm that they had sustained during the brief period of time in
which they had been suspended from school without a hearing. These
compensatory damages were divided into (1) general compensatory damages
for the harm "caused by the denial of procedural due process itself,"'5 9
and (2) special compensatory damages for the harm "caused by the suspen6
sions," provided the suspensions were proven to have been unjustified. 0
Now that we understand what types of remedies Justice Powell considered appropriate for infringements of voting and procedural due process
rights, we can determine what types of harms he perceived to be compensable
through damages. And once we have identified these types of harms, we
will be in a position to speculate about why he ruled that presumed general
damages are not recoverable for violations of procedural due process rights
in a case like Carey, but might be recoverable for violations of voting rights
in a case like Ashby or Nixon.
Because the only available remedy in a voting rights case like Ashby or
Nixon is damages, all of the intangible harms that a plaintiff suffers as a
direct result of the deprivation of the right to vote must be redressed
through an award of compensatory damages. Specifically, the award must
be sufficiently substantial to compensate the plaintiff for the "intangible
injury" that Justice Powell described as the "inability to vote in a particular
election" as well as any emotional distress that the plaintiff might have
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experienced. 16' Justice Powell characterized the intangible harm in a voting
62
rights case as a "nonmonetary harm that cannot easily be quantified,"'
and he suggested that presumed general damages might be an appropriate
remedy for such a loss because it is "likely to have occurred but difficult
6
to establish.'
By contrast, in a procedural due process case like Carey, there are two
complementary remedies to rectify the wrong to the plaintiff. The primary
remedy is specific relief. Through the issuance of both pretrial and permanent injunctions, the court orders the defendant to conduct a hearing in
accord with the requirements of procedural due process. The award of
compensatory damages is a secondary remedy designed to make the plaintiff
whole by redressing whatever losses have not been corrected by the issuance
of the injunction. Justice Powell must have viewed the denial of procedural
due process in a case like Carey as a single wrong that can be completely
corrected by the issuance of injunctive relief. Put another way, he must
have concluded that the harm which I have characterized as the "inability
to participate in a hearing" is fully rectified by the grant of specific relief.
If my speculation is correct, then the only intangible loss remaining to be
redressed by an award of general compensatory damages is "emotional
distress," which Justice Powell characterized as a nonmonetary harm "susceptible to proof."' 64 Consequently, he ruled that proven general damages
are an adequate remedy in procedural due process cases like Carey.
In summation, it is my conclusion that Justice Powell refused to award
presumed general damages in a procedural due process case like Carey
because he believed that the grant of injunctive relief corrected the plaintiff's
"inability to participate in a hearing conducted in accord with the requirements of procedural due process." "Emotional distress" is the only harm
for which general compensatory damages remain to be awarded, and that
is a harm "susceptible to proof." Consequently, proven general damages
are an adequate remedy. By contrast, Justice Powell expressed a willingness
to allow the recovery of presumed general damages in a voting rights case
like Ashby or Nixon because compensatory damages are the only available
remedy, and it would be difficult for the plaintiff to prove the value of an
"inability to vote in a particular election."
CONCLUSION

It is the thesis of this article that Carey and Stachura leave open the
question of whether presumed general damages will ever be recognized as
a remedy in constitutional tort litigation. Carey held that presumed general
damages are an inappropriate remedy for violations of procedural due
process, and Stachura held that presumed general damages may never be
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awarded for the inherent value of a constitutional right. Nonetheless, Justice
Powell indicated in both opinions that presumed general damages might be
recoverable for a nonmonetary harm that cannot easily be quantified. As
an example of such a harm, he discussed the injury caused by a deprivation
of the right to vote. He acknowledged that presumed general damages are
recoverable in common-law voting rights cases, and he suggested that they
also might be recoverable in constitutional tort cases.
The harm caused by a deprivation of the right to vote satisfies Justice
Powell's three criteria for an award of presumed damages. First, the harm
is nonmonetary or intangible. Second, the harm is one that is likely to
occur. And third, the harm is difficult to prove by objective evidence.
Because the harm caused by a deprivation of the right to vote possesses
these three characteristics, and because compensatory damages are the only
available remedy in a voting rights case like Ashby or Nixon, an award of
presumed general damages can be justified in such cases by reference to
Professor Weinrib's theory of corrective justice. The courts must allow the
recovery of presumed general damages in cases like Ashby or Nixon because,
without this remedy, there would be no way for a court to ensure that the
award of compensatory damages to a voting rights plaintiff would be
sufficiently substantial to "correct the injustice" done by the defendant.

